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BEYOND THE CLOUD: WHY THE NARROW DECISION IN 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. V. AEREO, INC. MAY HAVE 
BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR CLOUD-COMPUTING 
Robyn L. Rothman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Broadcasting 
Cos. V. Aereo Inc. (Aereo)1 invites meaningful discussion about how 
legal provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976 should be applied to 
new and emerging technologies.  In particular, Internet based storage, 
commonly known as “Cloud Services,” now runs the risk of copy-
right infringement based upon the decision in Aereo. 
At the time of the decision, the Court cautioned that its hold-
ing should be construed narrowly to the facts of the case.  However, 
because the Court decided against employing an analysis of the tech-
nology, the decision reached by the Court created negative implica-
tions for new emerging companies that employ similar systems.2  
Thus, this holding could have potentially profound effects on both 
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University of New York at Queens College. Special Thanks: To Professor Rena Seplowitz 
for all of her guidance and encouragement throughout my law school career and on this pa-
per. To the Touro Law Review Editorial Board for believing in my paper and all of the 
countless hours of hard work spent on the editorial process. To my father, William F. Roth-
man, Esq., I am eternally grateful for your love and guidance, you are my inspiration, and I 
am, and always will be proud to be your daughter. To my mother, Marcia Fox-Rothman, I 
would not be the woman I am today without your strength, love and patience to guide me 
and I am forever thankful. To my boyfriend, Ian Exner, for your unconditional love and en-
couragement over the last 10 years. To my sister, Hayley Rothman-Di Rico, my grandmoth-
ers, Roslyn Fox and Gladys Milgraum, I am forever thankful for your love and support. This 
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1 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).     
2 Id. at 2511. 
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current and emerging cloud-based technologies, as Aereo’s system 
was designed to create user specific private performances.3 
Part I will discuss the history of the current Copyright Act and 
its evolutionary application to modern advances in television and 
broadcasting technology.  It will also focus on the complexity and 
ambiguity of language within the Transmit Clause of the Copyright 
Act of 1976,4 examine how said language has caused varying inter-
pretations of the document, and determine how those varying inter-
pretations have led to legal complications within the growing tech-
industry.  Part II will describe the specific operation of Aereo’s sys-
tem and the function of “the Cloud,” while also examining the history 
and evolution of the Public Performance right leading to the creation 
of the Transmit Clause.  Part III will investigate the litigation Aereo 
faced, as it was alleged that Aereo had infringed upon the Network 
Broadcaster’s exclusive right to publicly perform their copyrighted 
works, while also describing Aereo’s use of the Cloud and how 
Cloud technology works. 
Parts IV and V of this paper will outline the Aereo litigation 
from the Southern District of New York through the Supreme Court.  
Finally, Part VI will argue in-depth how the Aereo decision will po-
tentially impact current and emerging cloud-based technologies and 
examine exactly why the prevailing application of the Transmit 
Clause, as was done in Aereo, will both enormously alter modern 
technology, and possibly stifle America’s technological innovation in 
the future. 
II. THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT AND THE TRANSMIT 
CLAUSE 
It has been a longstanding principle that artists, scientists, and 
innovators should be afforded adequate protections of their works 
without hindering advancement and progress in their respective 
fields.5  Federal copyright law was born from the belief that Congress 
has the ability to promote the progress of the arts and sciences while 
simultaneously affording adequate protections to authors, artists, and 
 
3 Mark P. McKenna, The Limits of the Supreme Court’s Technological Analogies, SLATE 
(June 26, 2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/ 
abc_v_aereo_ruling_the_supreme_court_s_terrible_technological_analogies.single.html. 
4 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
5 A Brief Introduction and History, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
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inventors.6  When the Continental Congress included this principle in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, several states had 
already enacted copyright statutes.7  Shortly after the ratification of 
the Constitution in 1790, the original version of the Copyright Act 
was passed in the second session of the first Congress.8  This most 
primitive version of the 1790 Copyright Act allowed for the right of 
reproduction and distribution of only “maps, charts, and books,” but 
has since been amended several times over 180 years to include a 
more comprehensive listing of rights for other forms of artistic and 
scientific works.9 
For the purposes of this paper, the most significant modifica-
tion to the 1790 Copyright Act was in 1856, when the right of “public 
performance” of dramatic works was amended into the statute.10  This 
particular 1856 amendment granted the copyright holder of a dra-
matic work the “sole right to . . . act, perform, or represent the same, 
or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or 
public place . . . .”11  This change gave the copyright holder the ulti-
mate control over the work in all aspects, if the public were to see, 
view, or hear the copyrighted work, it was at the sole discretion of the 
copyright holder. 
Another important alteration to the document came in 1897, 
when the Act was amended to include punishment for an unlawful 
public performance of a dramatic or musical composition in the form 
of monetary damages or imprisonment.12  If the public performance 
of the work was “willful and for profit,” the person found in violation 
would receive the latter form of punishment.13 
The Act was again revised in early 1909 to list the four exclu-
sive rights copyright owners held in Section 1.14  Thus, the 1909 
Copyright Act became the first to distinguish between dramatic 
works and musical works under the public performance right.15  
 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
7 Benjamin W. Rudd, Notable Dates in American Copyright 1783-1969, 28 Q.J. LIBR. 
CONGRESS 137, 138 (1971), http://www.copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf. 
8 Id. at 138. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 139. 
11 U.S. Copyright Amendment Act of 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 
12 U.S. Copyright Amendment Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82. 
13 Id. 
14 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1(a)-(e) (1909). 
15 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(d), (e) (1909). 
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However, the 1909 Copyright Act provided that a public performance 
occurs regardless of whether the work was performed in part or in 
whole, yet never expressly defined what constitutes to the “public” or 
to perform such a work “publicly.”16  The absence of any language 
establishing when a performance of a work becomes public has prov-
en to be a serious difficulty for courts when dealing with the in-
fringement of the public performance right.17 
Even further, technological advancements in television broad-
casting in the mid-twentieth century exposed the 1909 Copyright 
Act’s ambiguity in regard to “performing,” and doing so “publicly.”  
For example, the emergence of “community antenna television sys-
tems,” or CATV systems,18 in the 1960s enabled broadcast signals to 
reach large groups of the population that were previously unable to 
receive those broadcasts due to mountainous terrain obstructing 
broadcast reception.19  Advancements in CATV technology allowed 
one large antenna to retransmit one television broadcast signal to all 
of the company’s paid subscribers through a series of coaxial ca-
bles.20  The user was then charged a monthly fee to watch the broad-
casts instead of not being able to watch television broadcasts at all, or 
having to install antennas above their homes to gain reception of tel-
evision broadcasting.21  More modernly known as cable television, 
this new technology created a network that allowed television broad-
casting to reach even the most remote regions of the United States.22 
At the height of this monumental advancement in broadcast 
technology, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
two cases.  In both cases, network television providers alleged that 
the CATV systems infringed upon their exclusive right to perform 
 
16 Id. 
17 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396-402 (1968), su-
perseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, as recog-
nized in American Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Teleprompter Corp. v. 
Columbia Pictures Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 410-14 (1974), superseded by statute, 
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, as recognized in American Broad. 
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
18 See Cable Television, BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/technology/cable-
television#ref262049 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (CATV systems are more modernly known 
as cable television systems). 
19 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 392-93. 
22 John P. Cole, Community Antenna Television, the Broadcaster Establishment, and the 
Federal Regulator, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 124, 125-27 (1965). 
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their copyrighted works publicly.  In 1968, the Court in Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,23 determined that these new 
CATV systems merely enhanced viewer function because viewers 
did not necessarily “perform” in terms of the 1909 Copyright Act.24  
In other words, at this time, a viewer of a television broadcast did not 
facilitate the act of performing.  Since CATV systems allowed a new 
set of viewers to watch these broadcasts, there was no performance.  
While many early televisions were able to pick up signals that were 
within a certain distance, many times additional equipment such as a 
signal boosting antenna or an Ultra High Frequency (UHF) converter 
was needed to improve reception of local and/or further broadcast 
signals.25  Nevertheless, in certain areas of the country, such a signal 
was still nearly impossible to obtain, even with the most advanced 
home television equipment.26  As far as the system in Fortnightly was 
concerned, viewers in those parts of the country who could not re-
ceive the signal, or received a faint signal, could now fully obtain 
these signals through their coaxial cable connected to the larger 
community antenna.27  Thus, the Court in Fortnightly concluded that 
this new form of equipment was an enhanced form of what the view-
ers were already lawfully allowed to do.28 
The Court then reaffirmed this position six years later in 1974 
with Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.29  
While the CATV system in Fortnightly enabled viewers to receive 
signals within local broadcast areas, the system in Teleprompter ena-
bled viewers outside the local broadcast signal area to receive these 
same signals.30  The Court found this distinction to be of no conse-
quence.31  The Networks argued that extending the signals beyond the 
local broadcast area would significantly reduce retransmission fees to 
 
23 392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968). 
24 Id. at 398-99 (“Broadcasters perform.  Viewers do not . . . .  Essentially, a CATV sys-
tem no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals; it pro-
vides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.”). 
25 Roberto Baldwin, The History of the Set-Top Box: From Bunny Ears to Apple TV, 
WIRED (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/set-top-box-history-gallery-draft/. 
26 The Cable History Project, THE CABLE CENTER, http://cablecenter.org/cable-
history/108-the-cable-history-project-overview.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
27 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392. 
28 Id. at 399. 
29 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
30 Id. at 399-400. 
31 Id. at 413-14. 
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secondary markets.32  Ultimately, the Court found this argument un-
persuasive and reiterated that CATV systems did not perform public-
ly because they were an enhancement of the viewer function, as rea-
soned in Fortnightly.33  Under the Court’s interpretation, viewers did 
not publicly perform at all.34  A viewer was well within his or her 
right to receive the network broadcast signal and watch television in 
the comfort of his or her own home.35  Thus, if the CATV systems 
only enhanced the viewer experience, these systems did not per-
form.36 
The Court’s hesitance to compromise the exclusive rights held 
by the Networks and the functions of the CATV systems in both 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter was due in part to pending legislative 
proceedings to amend the 1909 Copyright Act.37  These proposed 
amendments finally came to fruition in 1976 when Congress enacted 
the current version of the Copyright Act.38  This new and significant 
overhaul of the Copyright Act sought to encompass actions of CATV 
systems.  The Act deemed these systems as infringing upon the ex-
clusive rights enumerated under §106.39  Congress then enacted lan-
 
32 Id. at 410-11. 
When a copyright holder first licenses a copyrighted program to be 
shown on broadcast television, he typically cannot expect to recoup his 
entire investment from a single broadcast.  Rather, after a program has 
had a ‘first run’ on the major broadcasting networks, it is often later syn-
dicated to affiliates and independent stations for ‘secondary run’ propa-
gation to secondary markets.  The copyright holders argue that if CATV 
systems are allowed to import programs and rechannel them into sec-
ondary markets they will dilute the profitability of later syndications, 
since viewer appeal, as measured by various rating systems, diminishes 
with each successive showing in a given market. 
Id. 
33 Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 403. 
34 Id. (quoting Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398). 
35 Id. at 400-01. 
36 Id. at 403. 
37 See Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 401; see also Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 414, n. 16. 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 47 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 101; 17 U.S.C. § 111. 
39 Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works 17 U.S.C. § 106: 
 
(1) Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale 
or other transfer or ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
6
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guage, which not only defined when a performance is “public,” but 
also encompassed the activities of the CATV systems.40  Specifically, 
subsection (2) of the definition of “public performance,” aptly named 
the “Transmit Clause,” afforded an alternative way to publicly per-
form a work through transmission (or retransmission) of a copyright-
ed work, by a signal or broadcast in one public place or multiple pub-
lic places by any device or means capable of doing so.41 
The addition of the Transmit Clause subsequently became a 
subject of highly contested debate.  Since its inclusion in the Copy-
right Act, several cases have analyzed what constituted a transmis-
sion of a “public” or “private” performance.  Many early cases at-
tempted to reason that if an entity played the same copy of the 
underlying work in a public place or to many groups of people at dif-
ferent times in a public place this would be considered a “public per-
formance” of the copyrighted work.42  For example, in Columbia Pic-
tures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,43 a video rental store allowed 
customers to watch a copy of a movie which was transmitted from 
the front of the store, where the video cassette player was held, to the 
back of the store, where individual viewing booths were housed.44  
The Third Circuit court concluded that the defendant’s movie rental 
 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work public-
ly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
40 17 U.S.C. § 101 To perform or display a work “publicly” means: 
 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a sub-
stantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social ac-
quaintances is gathered; or 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a 
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at differ-
ent times. 
41 Id. 
42 On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 
1991); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008); Fox TV 
Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Fox 
TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013). 
43 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984). 
44 Columbia Pictures Indus., 749 F.2d at 157. 
7
Rothman: Beyond the Cloud
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
282 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
store was publicly performing when it would transmit the same copy 
of the work to different members of the public at different times.45  
Similarly, the district court for the Northern District of California 
deemed a hotel was publicly performing when its video-on-demand 
system would show the same copy of the work to its patrons.46 
The Second Circuit Court has provided arguably one of the 
most significant interpretations of the Transmit Clause, having drawn 
from both the Third Circuit Court and the Northern District of Cali-
fornia Court cases.  In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,47 
the Second Circuit found that the Remote Storage Digital Video Re-
corder (RS-DVR) technology did not infringe upon the broadcaster’s 
exclusive public performance right.48  The RS-DVR technology al-
lowed subscribers of Cablevision to record shows for later viewing.49  
While the RS-DVR was similar to the traditional set-top DVR system 
that would record shows upon user demand,50 the new RS-DVR was 
housed in a central unit controlled by Cablevision and the user had 
the RS-DVR software installed in the set-top cable box.51  When Ca-
blevision received a signal (the original transmission) from the 
broadcasters, the signal would split between a “live viewing func-
tion” and “record function.”52  Each single viewer received his or her 
own personal copy from the second “record” function stream.  In oth-
er words, no two users had access to the same copy of a recorded 
show.53 
The Second Circuit developed four guideposts to determine 
when a transmission is considered “public” or “private.”54  First, the 
court looked to “who was capable of receiving the transmission.”  
Here, a transmission is private if the particular transmission is capa-
ble of being viewed by one individual, whereas, it is public if the 
transmission or retransmission is capable of being viewed by a much 
larger audience than the normal “family circle and its acquaintances” 
 
45 Id. at 162. 
46 On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 789. 
47 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
48 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 139-40. 
49 Id. at 124. 
50 Id. at 125. 
51 Id. at 124. 
52 Id. at 124-25. 
53 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 126. 
54 Id. at 134-39. 
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as defined in § 101.55  Second, private performances could not be 
grouped together (or aggregated), as this would frustrate the purpose 
of the Transmit Clause.56  This non-aggregation theory, as discussed 
further in this article, suggests that even if multiple private perfor-
mances are created by one singular entity, this does not infringe upon 
the public performance right.57 
Third, aggregation should only occur if private performances 
to members of the public in general, or members of the public in a 
public place, are being created from the same copy of the work.58  
Fourth, in walking through the Transmit Clause analysis, “any factor 
limiting the potential audience of a transmission is relevant.”59  In 
other words, any entity creating multiple performances ensures there 
is no infringement if proper steps are taken to actively prohibit the 
audience of any given transmission to remain within the threshold of 
the “normal family circle and its acquaintances.”60  This allowed 
Aereo to prevail in both the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.61 
However, two other courts found this long accepted reasoning 
unpersuasive.  In Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys.,62 the 
district court for the Central District of California ruled that an Inter-
net based television system infringed upon the public performance 
right.63  This case held that a performance of a work is considered 
 
55 Id. at 134. 
56 Id. at 135-36. 
We cannot reconcile the district court's approach with the language of 
the transmit clause.  That clause speaks of people capable of receiving a 
particular ‘transmission’ or ‘performance,’ and not of the potential audi-
ence of a particular ‘work.’  Indeed, such an approach would render the 
‘to the public’ language surplusage.  Doubtless the potential audience for 
every copyrighted audiovisual work is the general public.  As a result, 
any transmission of the content of a copyrighted work would constitute a 
public performance under the district court's interpretation.  But the 
transmit clause obviously contemplates the existence of non-public 
transmissions; if it did not, Congress would have stopped drafting that 
clause after ‘performance.’ 
Id. 
57 See Section V, infra. 
58 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 137-38. 
59 Id. at 137. 
60 Id. at 134. 
61 American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013). 
62 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
63 Fox TV Stations, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
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public when an entity retransmits the performance of the underlying 
work to members of the public, irrespective of whether users are 
watching individualized copies or transmissions of the work.64 
This same conclusion was reached by the District Court for 
the District of Columbia in Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X.65  This 
apparent split between Transmit Clause interpretations prompted the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to ABC, CBS, NBC, and the other 
Plaintiff Networks in their appeal of the Second Circuit decision in 
WNET v. Aereo.66 
III. THE AEREO AND THE CLOUD 
A. Analysis of “the Cloud” 
Modern Cloud computing, known affectionately as “the 
Cloud,” is a service that allows for the storage of data over the Inter-
net instead of on a computer’s hard drive.67  Third-party companies 
that house data centers, or hard drives in a separate location from the 
user also run the “Cloud.”68  These off-site hard-drives are connected 
to an entire network, allowing paying subscribers to then access these 
remote hard drives from almost anywhere and from any Internet ca-
pable device.69  For example, Apple Inc. offers one of the more 
commonly used cloud computing services today, aptly named, 
iCloud.70  Every Apple device and service user has access to Apple’s 
iCloud, which will store anything saved to a user’s iTunes account or 
Apple device.71  Each Apple device user has an iTunes account which 
stores information such as music purchased via the customers iTunes 
account, pictures, documents, phone numbers, etc.72  While all iTunes 
users are allotted a certain amount of iCloud storage space, users al-
 
64 Id. 
65 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013). 
66 Aereo Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2504. 
67 Eric Griffith, What is Cloud Computing?, PC MAGAZINE (Apr. 17, 2015),      
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00.asp. 
68 Id. 
69 What is Cloud Computing?, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/what-is-
cloud-computing.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
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ways have the option of either deleting files or purchasing more 
space on iCloud for a small monthly fee.73  Additionally, no two us-
ers have access to the same storage space.  Accessing an iCloud ac-
count is a completely private and password-protected experience.74 
Businesses of all sizes use cloud services as means to store 
hundreds of thousands of pieces of data electronically75  It is more ef-
ficient for businesses to store, organize, and protect sensitive docu-
ments via a third-party Cloud-based system.  As opposed to handling 
paper filing systems that can be stolen, lost, or assume an exuberant 
amount of office space.76  “The Cloud” has been proven to be a more 
convenient for people to store data than the conventional methods 
that preceded it.  Therefore, more companies are beginning to work 
with the cloud model.77 
B. Aereo and Its Process 
Aereo was an American Internet-based television provider, 
which allowed users to watch broadcast television without having to 
subscribe to a cable or satellite bundle package.78  For a small month-
ly fee customers had the ability to watch broadcast television via any 
Internet-capable device.79  At the time of litigation, Aereo was only 
available to customers in the New York Metropolitan area.80  Cur-
rently, Aereo has ceased operations and has filed for Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy.81  However, in an interesting twist, Aereo has been ac-
quired by TiVo, which plans to release a similar product claiming to 
be the legal alternative to Aereo.82 




75 Uses of Cloud Computing, APPRENDA, https://apprenda.com/library/cloud/uses-of-
cloud-computing/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Inside Aereo, PROTECTMYANTENNA, http://protectmyantenna.org (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016). 
79 Id. 
80 American Broad. Cos. Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
81 Jordan Clark, Aereo Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/21/aereo-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy/. 
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in a single warehouse in Brooklyn.83  Each dime-sized antenna was 
dedicated to only one customer; meaning, no two customers could 
capture the broadcast television signals from the same antenna.84  
Aereo’s antennas also remained idle when a customer was not watch-
ing or recording a show.85  The antenna tuned into a frequency, in 
which no broadcast signals were available when the cable service was 
not in use.86  Each antenna stood idle in this unreachable frequency, 
and only immediately became active when a user either elected to 
watch a show or recorded the show for later viewing.87 
Once the antenna became active by the sole customer as-
signed to that antenna, it then tuned back into the frequency that cap-
tured the active over-the-air broadcast signal.88  The antenna immedi-
ately began recording the broadcast and saved it to the cloud storage 
where it played for the customer to view on any Internet-capable de-
vice.89  Aereo’s customers had two functions available to them: 
“watch” a show or “record” a show.90  When a customer elected the 
“watch” function, the antenna captured the signal, made a copy of 
that signal, and saved that copy to the cloud.91  Only after the signal 
was saved to the cloud was the viewer able to “watch.”  In this case, a 
viewer was able to watch the television program in almost real-time 
with only a few seconds delay.92  In comparison, when the customer 
elected to “record” the show, the antenna performed the same set of 
functions as it did for the “watch” feature with the copy stored in the 
cloud to be accessed by the user to be viewed later, as opposed to live 
playback.93 
C. Aereo: Cloud Zero 
Beginning in 2010, Aereo offered cloud storage to users who 
 
83 WNET, 712 F.3d at 682. 
84 Id. at 682-83. 
85 Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 28, American Broad. Cos. et al. v. Aereo, Inc. 134 S. 
Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Brief LEXIS 5050 [hereinafter Brief for Ap-
pellee-Respondent]. 
86 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 7. 
87 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 28-29. 
88 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 28-29. 
89 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 8-9. 
90 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 7. 
91 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 9. 
92 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 9. 
93 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 9-10. 
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wanted to watch live or recorded broadcast television, but did not 
want to pay the high cost of cable or satellite television.94  Users were 
able to watch live television or previously recorded television shows 
from any Internet-capable device from their Aereo account.95  As 
aforementioned, no two users had access to the same account; no two 
users had access to the same antenna; and as long as each user was 
connected to the Internet in the geographic location where Aereo op-
erated, they could watch their favorite shows.96 
IV. THE NETWORK BROADCASTERS VERSUS AEREO 
A. Aereo I 
In 2011, Plaintiffs, ABC, NBC, WNET, CBS, among other 
television networks (collectively “Networks”) filed a suit in the 
Southern District of New York against the online television stream-
ing service, Aereo.97  The suit alleged that Aereo was infringing upon 
the public performance right by retransmitting the free over–the-air 
broadcast signals to the members of the public as defined by the 
transmit clause, and then charging a monthly fee for its use.98  In this 
case, the District Court was called upon to address several issues.  
Firstly, the court had to determine if Aereo’s individual antennas 
worked as one large antenna or if they worked independently.99  Sec-
ondly, the court assessed whether Aereo’s system was distinguishable 
from the facts and holding in Cablevision to determine if the net-
work’s assertion of infringement was likely to succeed on the merits 
of their claim.100  Lastly, the court had to decide whether an injunc-
tion was appropriate.101 
 
94 PROTECTMYANTENNA, supra note 78. 
95 Brief for Appellee-Respondent, supra note 85, at 8-9 
96 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680-83 (2d Cir. 2013). 
97 American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
98 Id. at 375. 
99 Id. at 379. 
100 Id. at 382. 
101 American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (citing Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156 (2d 
Cir. 2010).  (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, granted only if the plain-
tiff establishes ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits that he is likely to suffer irreparable 
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.’  Even if a plaintiff has not demonstrated a likeli-
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The Plaintiff Networks asserted that, although Aereo’s system 
was comprised of thousands of tiny dime-sized antennas specifically 
assigned privately to separate users, the system’s overall structure 
was just a modern-day CATV system102  They contended that be-
cause the tiny antennas were placed on a shared metallic substructure, 
these antennas worked essentially as one large antenna.103  After 
hearing expert testimony that debated the significance of the individ-
ual antennae, the court then determined that Aereo’s individual an-
tennas worked independently of each other to create separate private 
performances and not as one larger antenna, which would create one 
large public performance.104 
As well, the District Court determined the Networks’ asser-
tion of infringement was not likely to succeed on the merits because 
the controlling Second Circuit precedent in Cablevision was signifi-
cantly applicable to the facts in Aereo.105  The Networks claimed that 
Aereo’s system was factually distinguishable from that in Cablevi-
sion for several reasons.106  First, the Networks alleged that Aereo 
publicly performs because it is the functional equivalent of a CATV 
system.107  Instead of accepting that each distinct copy was transmit-
ted from an individual antenna, the Networks argued that the anten-
nas collectively formed one larger antenna that pass along the origi-
nal transmission to all of Aereo’s customers and was thus illegal.108 
The court’s rejection of the claim that Aereo transmitted one 
collective broadcasting signal determines that Aereo’s case is strong-
er here than it was in Cablevision.  This is because Aereo’s copies are 
made from separate streams of data from each antenna receiving the 
original signal as opposed to the single stream of data transmitted by 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR.109  In other words, Aereo’s system is not 
 
hood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction may still be granted if the plaintiff 
shows ‘a serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for trial, with a bal-
ance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor.’”). 
102 American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385. 
103 Id. at 379. 
104 Id. at 381. 
105 Id. at 392 (citing Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), 
which held that the RS-DVR technology used by the defendants did not create a public per-
formance with respect to the Transmit Clause because each user was viewing his or her own 
exclusive private performance of the copyrighted work). 
106 Id. at 389. 
107 American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 387. 
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continuously relaying one singular transmission to its users from one 
large antenna.  Instead, each user receives his or her own transmis-
sion because each person is receiving just one copy from his or her 
own antenna. 
Additionally, the Networks’ argument failed because of its re-
liance on the time-shifting analysis that was used by the Cablevision 
court to address the RS-DVR’s potential for infringement.110  The 
court harshly criticized the Networks’ reliance on time-shifting pri-
marily because the Cablevision court did not apply the time-shifting 
analysis to the public performance issue in that case.  Instead, the 
time-shifting element was used in the discussion of a different issue 
relating to fair use of the copyrighted work.111 
Although the Court found that the Networks were likely to 
suffer irreparable harm from decreased viewership absent a prelimi-
nary injunction, the Plaintiffs’ motion was ultimately denied.  The 
Court found that doing so would create a burden upon Aereo that 
substantially outweighed any burden upon the Networks.112 
B. Aereo II 
The Networks appealed the judgment of the Southern District 
to the Second Circuit asserting an abuse of discretion by the lower 
court in denying their motion for preliminary injunction,113 asserting 
several arguments, which attempted to distinguish the Cablevision 
decision from Aereo, which ultimately failed.114 
The Networks asserted that both the plain language of the 
Transmit Clause and the legislative intent behind the 1976 Copyright 
Act deemed Aereo’s system analogous to a cable system.115  Thus, 
the Networks asserted that Aero publicly performed their copyrighted 
works.  While the Networks attempted to distinguish Aereo from the 
controlling Cablevision case, the court found no merit to all of the 
Networks’ arguments.116  The Second Circuit rebuffed the Networks’ 
assertion by carefully examining Cablevision’s four prevailing 
 
110 Id. 
111 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
112 American Broad. Cos., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d at 405. 
113 WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). 
114 Id. at 695. 
115 Id. at 686. 
116 Id. at 689-95. 
15
Rothman: Beyond the Cloud
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
290 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
guideposts to analyzing the Transmit Clause while also scrutinizing 
how Aereo’s technology functioned in comparison to a cable televi-
sion system.117  In finding that Cablevision controlled and that the 
Network’s assertions gave unpersuasive determinations, the Second 
Circuit affirmed.118 
After losing two cases, the Networks found one judge who 
was persuaded by their argument.119  In his dissent, Judge Chin was 
not convinced that Aereo’s technology made Aereo distinctive from 
traditional cable systems.120  He criticized Aero’s technology and 
deemed it a “Rube Goldberg-like contrivance” in that Aereo simply 
built their system to evade copyright liability.121  Judge Chin orga-
nized his dissenting opinion into three sections.122  First, Judge Chin 
argued that the 1976 Act’s text applied directly to the activities of 
Aereo.123  He implied that the separate private performances created 
by Aereo via the company’s independent-acting antennae system 
should be aggregated because these performances were ultimately 
created by one entity.124  He further asserted that even if separate per-
formances were indeed limited to persons within the normal circle of 
the family and their acquaintances, ultimately, Aereo transmitted un-
derlying performances to paying subscribers numbered in the thou-
sands.125  Thus, concluding that Aereo’s broadcasting system per-
formed publicly.126 
Second, Judge Chin found that Aereo’s activities fell within 
the legislative intent behind the amendment of the 1909 Act, which 
resulted in the 1976 Act.127  His ruling is based on the idea that since 
Aereo charges for the use of the service to relay broadcast television 
and cloud storage space, it is essentially a cable system.128  He further 
found that the amendment to the 1909 Act was done so with the 
emergence of new technologies in mind, asserting not only that the 
 
117 Id. at 689. 
118 WNET, 712 F.3d at 695. 
119 Id. at 697-705 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 701. 
121 Id. at 697. 
122 Id. at 696-705. 
123 WNET, 712 F.3d at 698-99. 
124 Id. at 698. 
125 Id. at 699. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 WNET, 712 F.3d at 700. 
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Act was to cover all known technology, but that technology that 
would emerge for years to come.129 
Finally, Judge Chin made his own comparison of the decision 
and technology in Cablevision to that of Aereo’s technology.  He 
found that Aereo’s system is entirely distinguishable from the RS-
DVR in Cablevision for two reasons.130  First, Judge Chin argued that 
Cablevision was exclusively reproducing materials that it already 
held the right to retransmit.131  In comparison, Aereo was allowing 
the copying and retransmission of copyrighted materials with no 
permission to do so.132  In Judge Chin’s view, infringement of copy-
right falls squarely on who has legal ownership over the work, and 
since Cablevision was legally allowed to publicly perform the work 
in the first instance, it was permissible that they allowed public per-
formances in the second instance.133  However, because Aereo did not 
have a right to the broadcasted materials, it follows that Aereo had no 
right to then allow its users to watch the materials.134 
Judge Chin’s second reason for why Aereo’s system is factu-
ally distinct was slightly more contrived.  He asserted that Aereo’s 
system allowed the company to obtain copyrighted materials in 
which it had no license and provided users with two functions to 
watch the work, whereas Cablevision only gave their users one unli-
censed option to watch the programs.135  He claimed that user interac-
tion was entirely different between Aereo and Cablevision.136  Judge 
Chin’s assessment that RS-DVR technology “was not designed to be 
a substitute viewing live television broadcasts” is subject to question-
ing.137  He concluded that the two systems are inherently different be-
cause Cablevision’s users had to manually initiate the RS-DVR sys-
tem to record, while Aereo’s users do not intentionally ask Aereo to 
record a copy under the “watch” function; instead, it is the Aereo sys-
 
129 Id. at 701 (“While Congress in 1976 might not have envisioned the precise technologi-
cal innovations employed by Aereo today, this legislative history surely suggests that Con-
gress could not have intended for such a system to fall outside the definition of a public per-
formance.”). 
130 Id. at 701-03. 
131 Id. at 702. 
132 Id. 
133 WNET, 712 F.3d at 702. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 702-03. 
136 Id. at 702. 
137 Id. at 703. 
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tem automatically initiating the copy, not the users.138 
While Aereo and Cablevision may differ slightly in regards to 
a user’s experience of the record functions, Judge Chin’s assessment 
that Aereo and Cablevision broadcasting systems are inherently dif-
ferent is entirely incorrect.  As aforementioned, Aereo remained 
completely idle until a user logged in to order either the live broad-
cast or a recorded copy of live broadcast.139  The copy that occurred 
during the live function was a buffering mechanism that would be 
continuously deleted when the user viewed that specific part of the 
show.140  In his assessment of why Cablevision is factually distin-
guishable, he seemingly compared apples to oranges in order to con-
clude that Aereo and Cablevision are, in fact, apples and oranges, 
since he believes Aereo’s technology is just a fancy cable system.  
While Judge Chin did focus on the differences in technologies be-
tween the two systems, he takes issue with how Aereo presented it-
self to the public as well as the issue of failing to hold a copyright for 
retransmission.141  Further, his finding that because Aereo’s users did 
not specifically ask for the system to begin making a copy under the 
“watch” function, the interaction was completely different from the 
user interaction in Cablevision.142  However, Cablevision’s system 
split the “live” and “record” streams without user command, whereas 
Aereo’s system required user interaction to pick up or record a live 
stream for a performance to occur.143  To Judge Chin, this was noth-
ing more than an unnecessary distinction – essentially a 21st century 
mechanism for evading copyright laws.144 
 
138 WNET, 712 F.3d at 701-02. 
139 See Section II(b), supra. 
140 WNET, 712 F.3d at 682. 
141 Id. at 702. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 703. 
144 Id. at 697.  The author provided: 
Aereo's “technology platform” is, however, a sham.  The system em-
ploys thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no tech-
nologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas 
rather than one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-
like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the 
Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the law. 
WNET, 712 F.3d at 697. 
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V. THE SUPREME COURT AND AEREO 
In a six-to-three majority opinion written by Justice Breyer, 
the Networks’ argument that Aereo publicly performed found suc-
cess.145  The majority focused more on the intent of the 1976 Copy-
right Act rather than setting a standard to interpret the ambiguous 
language of the Transmit Clause with respect to new technology.146  
The Court provides no discussion for why it found that the technolog-
ical differences between a cable system and Aereo were insignificant.  
Instead, the majority takes a two-step approach in determining that 
Aereo publicly performed.147  First, the Court inquired whether Aereo 
“performed” and if so, whether the performance was public?148  The 
basis for the majority’s opinion however, falls on a technologically – 
neutral approach to applying Aereo to the Transmit Clause.149 
In writing for the majority, Justice Breyer spends little time 
incorporating the factual differences between Aereo’s system and a 
cable system.  While the majority decision briefly discusses how 
Aereo works, nevertheless, these facts are left almost entirely out of 
the legal analysis of the discussion.  Instead, at the onset, the majority 
felt that Aereo was the modern day equivalent of a cable system and 
then preceded to use the historical context behind the 1976 Act to 
support this contention.150 
The Court took a two-step approach to determine if Aereo in-
fringed on the public performance right.  First, the Court asked 
whether Aereo “performed” and then whether Aereo performed “pub-
licly.”151  The Court’s analysis followed a functionalist approach that 
looked not to the technological differences of Aereo’s system with 
that of a cable system, but rather that Aereo’s system in general func-
tions like a cable system.  In rejecting the Second Circuit’s conten-
tions that the Transmit Clause directs analysis to who is “capable of 
receiving” the transmission and any factor “limiting the potential au-
dience” to a particular transmission, the Court found that it is the re-
lationship between members of the public to the underlying work that 
 
145 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2500-02. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 2504-05. 
148 Id. 
149 Samuel J. Dykstra, Weighing Down the Cloud: The Public Performance Right and the 
Internet After Aereo, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 989, 1023-26, 1028-29, 1034, 1049 (2015). 
150 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504. 
151 Id. 
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will create a public performance.152  In this sense, because the under-
lying performance (i.e., the original transmission) was made “to the 
public,” any retransmission would then be considered a “public per-
formance” of the work. 
While the Court did note at least one technological difference 
between Aereo and cable systems, it found this difference irrele-
vant.153  Instead, the Court rendered Aereo’s discrete transmissions as 
indistinguishable from the retransmissions created from a CATV sys-
tem and through implication, aggregated the private retransmissions 
made to the members of the public that the original transmission was 
made publicly available to determine that Aereo did in fact perform 
publicly.154  The aggregation of the private performances led the 
Court to the conclusion that it is because Aereo allows members of 
the public to watch free over-the-air television; it is the functional 
equivalent to a cable system.155 
The Court’s interpretation frustrates the long accepted under-
standing of whether a particular transmission is capable of reaching 
those outside of a normal family circle, which has been accepted pri-
marily by the Second Circuit as well as other district courts through-
out the country.  The Court’s functional approach offered little guid-
ance on how an entity performs publicly and instead leaves the lower 
courts with wide discretion in deciding whether the public perfor-
mance right has been infringed in regard to new technologies.156  This 
analysis deviates considerably from the complex analysis that the Se-
cond Circuit employed.  While the Second Circuit looked closely to 
the facts of each case and differences in technologies, it paid closer 
attention to the language of the Transmit Clause, which in turn would 
then be carefully applied to the case at bar.157  The Supreme Court in 
Aereo gave no technical analysis but instead offered the historical 
background of the development of the Transmit Clause as a pretext to 
the resulting analysis.158  The Court essentially left new and emerging 
technologies at the mercy of cable companies and outdated case 
 
152 Id. at 2507-08. 
153 Id. at 2507. 
154 Id. at 2508. 
155 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-10. 
156 Id. at 2517. 
157 WNET, 712 F.3d at 686-94. 
158 Aereo, 134 S. Ct at 2504. 
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law.159  Therefore, the Court found that because Aereo’s activities 
were substantially similar to those of cable television companies, 
Congress intended to include a system like Aereo’s under the 1976 
Copyright Act.160  However, as a preemptive measure, the Court es-
tablished that its holding should only be strictly limited to systems 
functioning like Aereo’s as to not frustrate current and emerging 
technologies.161 
In writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices 
Alito and Thomas, pointed out many of the inherent flaws that are as-
sociated with the majority’s analogical reasoning.162  In particular, 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Aereo’s technology is designed so 
that it is the user who controls Aereo’s functionality.163  The dissent 
begins with the discussion of the volitional conduct test that is asso-
ciated with many copyright infringement cases that involve new 
technologies.164  This test, which was fully recognized by the Su-
preme Court in Sony, looks at how the system is controlled.165  This 
volitional conduct rule was adopted by the Second Circuit in Cablevi-
sion as a deciding factor in finding that the RS-DVR was not an in-
fringement.166  On the one hand, if the system is entirely or mostly 
controlled by user conduct, the system is not directly liable for copy-
right infringement, but is secondarily liable.167  If the system leaves 
little control to the user, then it is directly liable for copyright in-
fringement.168  The dissent heavily criticizes the way the majority 
overlooks the technological differences, instead opting to simply 
compare Aereo to a cable company.169  Although in his discussion, 
Scalia acknowledged that Aereo may nevertheless be skirting the 
 
159 Id. at 2511. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 2510.  (“We agree that Congress, while intending the Transmit Clause to apply 
broadly to cable companies and their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control 
the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.  But we do not believe that our lim-
ited holding today will have that effect.”). 
162 Id. at 2511-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
163 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 131-32. 
167 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168 Columbia Pictures Indus., 749 F.2d at 156-62; On Command Video Corp., 777 F. 
Supp. at 788-90; Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 130-40; Fox Television Stations, Inc., 915 
F. Supp. 2d at 1143-46; Fox Television Stations, Inc., F. Supp. 2d at 37-42, 45-49. 
169 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2515-517. 
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Copyright Act, he rejected the way in which the majority finds for in-
fringement.170  The dissent points to the inherent confusion the major-
ity will cast upon new forms of technology with respect to the public 
performance right because the Court failed to account for the very 
different functions of each system.171 
VI. WHERE THE SUPREME COURT WENT WRONG ON THE 
TRANSMIT CLAUSE 
The majority in Aereo declined to assess the Transmit Clause 
in a way that could be applied to Aereo’s system.172  In opting for a 
simple and neutral approach to how the Clause should read with re-
spect to new innovations, the decision leaves long-standing legal 
principles and new technologies waiting in the wind.  This part will 
examine three ways in which the Court’s decision broadened the 
scope of the Transmit Clause. 
A. Neutrality Over Complexity 
The Supreme Court’s analysis demonstrates its misunder-
standing of why differences in technological functions are key to in-
terpreting the Transmit Clause.  Instead of rendering an opinion on 
how to interpret the language of the Transmit Clause with which the 
lower courts grappled with, the Court chose a route that can further 
confuse and invite a flood of litigation.173  The crux of the Court’s 
discussion falls primarily on the contention that Aereo is the func-
tional equivalent of a cable system.  While, on its face, Aereo might 
resemble a cable system, its differences in technology are important 
factors as to why Aereo should not be equated with a cable system.  
In relying solely on Congressional intent of the Transmit Clause, the 
Court overlooked over 35 years of technical innovation and case law 
and essentially tipped the Constitutional scale in favor of copyright 
holders and leaving the progression of the arts and sciences hanging 
by a thread. 
The Transmit Clause was included in the 1976 Copyright Act 
 
170 Id. at 2514-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2014). 
171 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
172 Id. at 2509 (explaining that, “[w]e do not see how the fact that Aereo transmits via per-
sonal copies of the programs could make a difference”). 
173 Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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as a way to encompass new technology emerging in broadcast televi-
sion.174  The majority took the approach that if an entity like Aereo 
looked like a cable company then it is a cable company, which then 
falls under what the 1976 Act sought to cover.175  Cable television 
companies are granted a compulsory license through Section 111 of 
the Copyright Act.176  This license enables cable companies to re-
transmit the copyrighted works in exchange for a fee instead of pay-
ing each network directly for a license to publicly perform each copy-
righted work.177  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
reserves the right to regulate the cable industry and in turn, once a 
company is deemed a “cable company,” it is granted a compulsory 
license through Section 111.178  However, as of today, Internet televi-
sion providers are not considered “cable companies” under either the 
Copyright Act or the Federal Communications Act.179 
Aereo and the Networks’ claim that Aereo is not a cable sys-
tem is not due to compromise.  This contention is supported by the 
FCC, which has determined that cable systems do not include any 
“facility that serves only to retransmit television signals of one or 
more television broadcast stations.”180  While this does not support 
Aereo’s contention that its system does not publicly perform the 
Network’s copyrighted works, the FCC makes clear that any system 
similar to Aereo’s is not a cable system.  Under FCC guidelines, em-
ploying a neutral approach to differences in technology seems mis-
placed.  It then makes no sense as to why the Court would essentially 
deem Aereo a “cable company” if the FCC has outright denied that 
any equivalent to Aereo is not a cable system.  The determination that 
Aereo is essentially a cable system in terms of the public perfor-
mance right and Transmit Clause under the 1976 Copyright seems 
then to run counterintuitive to not only both Aereo’s and the Net-
works’ arguments, but a widely accepted understanding of cable sys-
tems set forth by a government run agency. 
 
174 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 1976 WL 
14045. 
175 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506-07. 
176 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2014). 
177 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506. 
178 Id. 
179 MARYBETH PETERS, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT 
SECTION 109 REPORT, at 181 (June 2008). 
180 Cable Television, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-television (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
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B. The Bigger and Badder Transmit Clause: Leaving 
Private Performances in the Cloudy Dust 
Part II of the Court’s majority opinion addresses the issue of 
whether Aereo “performs” as defined by the 1976 Copyright Act and 
then if Aereo performs, whether it does so “publicly.”181  The Court 
delved into a lengthy discussion of the history of cable systems and 
the public performance right in Part II of the opinion.182  However, 
after determining that Aereo “performs,” the Court’s analysis be-
comes problematic.  It is here that the Court deemed Aereo’s system 
analogous to the cable systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter but 
provided no technological analysis as to how it came to this conclu-
sion.183  The Court stated that the only difference between the sys-
tems is the consistent receiving and retransmitting by cable compa-
nies and the user controlled receiving and retransmitting by Aereo.184  
Instead, the Court saw no reason why this difference should be given 
any analytical weight because regardless, Aereo’s basic function is 
equivalent to a cable system.185  Further, the Court ignored that cable 
systems ran on one large antenna connected through users via a series 
of coaxial cables, whereas Aereo’s systems run on hundreds of user 
specific antennae.186  In cable systems, all of the subscribers tune into 
the same transmission coming from one antenna and share that singu-
lar stream.  In terms of Aereo, each user is assigned his or her own 
antenna, which transmits its own copy to the cloud for that particular 
user to receive.187  Without even laying a foundational argument as to 
why Aereo is similar to a cable system, the Court simply made the 
determinative assertion that Aereo is a functional equivalent, which 
leads the Court’s conclusion to follow that Aereo performs because 
cable systems perform.188 
Justice Scalia asserted in his dissent that because the Court 
deemed Aereo’s system the functional equivalent of a cable system, 
the rest of the majority opinion’s discussion is simply superfluous.189  
 
181 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504. 
182 Id. at 2504-06. 
183 Id. at 2506. 
184 Id. at 2507. 
185 Id. 
186 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508-09. 
187 Id. at 2508. 
188 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507. 
189 Id. at 2515. 
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Under the 1976 Copyright Act, cable systems not only perform but 
they perform publicly.190  Since the majority renders Aereo an equiv-
alent to a cable system, any discussion as to “public performance” 
seems unnecessary.  Even though the Court continued with a “public 
performance” analysis, the Court’s predetermination set up in Part II 
renders any conclusion on the issue unnecessary. 
Regardless, Part III of the Court’s analysis attempts to address 
“whether Aereo performs petitioners’ works publicly.”191  While it is 
here that the Court touches upon the fact that Aereo’s system creates 
discrete transmissions through multiple antennas dedicated to only 
one user, it still renders these differences indistinguishable from cable 
systems in terms of Congressional intent behind the 1976 Copyright 
Act.192  The Court furthered this conclusion by applying the plain 
language of the Transmit Clause.193  It is here that the Court began to 
forgo the Copyright Act’s non-applicability to private performances 
and implied that the language of the Transmit Clause calls for an ag-
gregation of discrete performances regardless of whether they occur 
in the home to one person or to a place where a large gathering of the 
public occurs.194 
The Court honed in on the specific language in the Transmit 
Clause – “whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance or display receiving it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times” – to determine that 
when an entity transmits even separate and distinct transmissions, it 
is publicly performing.195  To further this point, several examples 
were employed to support this conclusion.196  What the Court does, 
however, is aggregate private performances to determine that a public 
 
190 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 111 (West 2014). 
191 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507-08. 
192 Id. at 2508. 
193 Id. at 2509. 
194 Id. at 2509. 
195 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2014). 
196 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.  The Court stated: 
But the Clause suggests that an entity may transmit a performance 
through multiple discrete transmissions.  That is because one can ‘trans-
mit’ or ‘communicate’ something through a set of actions.  Similarly, 
one’s colleagues may watch a performance of a particular performance.  
Whether they do so at separate or at the same showings.  By the same 
principle, an entity may transmit a performance through one or several 
transmissions, where the performance is of the same work. 
Id. 
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performance has occurred.197  It then implicitly confuses the types of 
systems the courts dealt with in Redd Horne and On Demand Video 
Corp and asserted Aereo’s system employed the same functions.198 
This flawed assumption misinterprets both the public perfor-
mance right and the Transmit Clause entirely.  Perhaps the Court un-
derestimated just how ambiguous the definitional language of public 
performance in § 101 really is.  As mentioned previously, § 101 sets 
out two distinctions of when a copyrighted work is performed public-
ly; one being the threshold of when private becomes public, and the 
other being the Transmit Clause.199  The Copyright Act makes clear 
that if a work is performed or displayed in the privacy of one’s home 
in front of a normal family circle and its acquaintances, then the work 
is performed privately.200  When a work is performed or displayed 
privately, it is not an infringement on a copyright holder’s exclusive 
rights because the copyright holder only has the right to display or 
perform his or her works publicly or authorize such rights.201  There-
fore, under the plain meaning of the statute, Aereo’s users are per-
forming privately when they deliberately enable Aereo’s user-
specific individual antennas to capture the broadcast signal and play 
that signal in their own home. 
Regardless of this reasoning, Aereo and its users’ actions fall 
under the Transmit Clause which renders transmissions or communi-
cations “public performances” if they are done so to the public, a 
specified in subsection (1) by “any device or process” regardless if 
the members of the public are together or in separate places.202  The 
Transmit Clause employs peculiar language in that a public perfor-
mance of a work is transmitted or communicated to the public if the 
public is situated together or separately and receive it all at the same 
time or at different times.  If this language were taken literally, it al-
most seems as if this language renders even private performances as 
public ones.203 
Many prominent intellectual property law commentators have 
 
197 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-510. 
198 Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 154; On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 787. 
199 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390; Teleprompter, 94 S. Ct. at 1129; 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 
(2010). 
200 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 386 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter NIMMER]. 
201 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (2002). 
202 RUDD, supra note 7, at 4. 
203 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 1. 
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discussed how the courts should look at the Transmit Clause and the 
public performance right.204  Professor M. Nimmer has long advocat-
ed for the non-aggregation of private performances,205 whereas Pro-
fessor Paul Goldstein has supported a “pro-aggregation” approach.206  
This split in analyses has accurately reflected the complexity of both 
the Transmit Clause and the public performance right with respect to 
emerging technologies.  The broad language of the Transmit Clause 
has led to confusion and uncertainty as to how the Clause should be 
applied and analyzed.207 
One theory, Professor Nimmer’s “Non-Aggregation Theory,” 
postulates that the language of the Transmit Clause was intended to 
reflect an instance when the same copy or transmission of a work is 
played repeatedly to different members of the public although played 
at different times, resulting in a public performance of that copy.208  
This theory would seem to make better sense of the ambiguous lan-
guage, and many courts have followed this reasoning.209  This was 
the basis for Cablevision’s holding.210  In accordance with Nimmer, 
the Second Circuit argued that the unique copies of the underlying 
performance have the capability of reaching only one user and no one 
else.211  The production of individual copies substantially limits the 
exposure to anyone outside the normal family circle and its acquaint-
ances, satisfying a private performance.212 
A cable system works differently from Aereo’s system.  A 
cable system not only retransmits free over-the-air signals to its cus-
tomers but supplies their own unique programming as well.  Since the 
decisions in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, the cable industry has 
grown tremendously, while still retaining many of the same basic 
 
204 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT (3d ed. 2009). 
205 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 42. 
206 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167. 
207 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 29. 
208 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 29. 
209 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 121 (finding that “the transmit clause directs us to 
examine who precisely is ‘capable of receiving’ a particular transmission of a perfor-
mance.”); Columbia Pictures Indus., 749 F.2d at 154 (holding that the defendant’s activities 
in exhibiting videocassettes of plaintiff’s films for a fee in private booths constituted public 
performances); On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. 787 (finding that, “whether these 
guests view the transmission simultaneously or sequentially, the transmission is still a public 
performance since it goes to members of the public.”). 
210 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 138. 
211 Id.  (“[A] cable company performs when it retransmits a copyrighted work.”). 
212 Id. 
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functions.  Cable television systems place various regional facilities 
which house signal reception equipment around their designated re-
gion of operation and each customer is plugged into these facilities 
through a complex system of coaxial cables.213  When these facilities 
receive the broadcast signals, they retransmit a new singular stream 
of the data to their customers who then receive this singular stream.214  
The receiving equipment in these regional facilities receives the 
broadcast signals on a constant basis and then the retransmissions run 
constantly as well.215  In accordance with both Nimmer and the Se-
cond Circuit’s analysis, the retransmissions are capable of being re-
ceived by members of the public outside the normal family circle.216  
Thus, the lack of individualized singular transmissions capable of on-
ly being received by each individual user is why a cable system per-
forms publicly.217  Nimmer calls for the aggregation of the private 
performances from the singular stream of data and not private per-
formances from individualized retransmissions.218 
Aereo and its Amici fully supported Nimmer’s “non-
aggregation” theory and advocated that Aereo does not perform pub-
licly.219  In its brief, Dish Network defends Nimmer’s theory by em-
phasizing that the Transmit clause is applicable to “multicasting,” a 
process by which a singular transmission reaches many members of 
the public.220  However, Aereo’s system creates “unicasting,” which 
is a one-to-one transmission, only capable of reaching one person, or 
 
213 The State of the Art and Evolution of Cable Television and Broadband Technology, 
CTC TECH & ENERGY (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.ctcnet.us.html. 
214 Krista Consiglio, Aereo and FilmOn: Technology’s Latest Copyright War and Why 
Aereo Should Survive, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2557 (2014). 
215 Id. 
216 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 386; Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 121. 
217 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-11. 
218 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 29. 
219 Brief for 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Professors as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 
13-461), 2014 WL 1348474; Brief for Intellectual Property & Copyright Law Professors as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2012 WL 5387386; Brief for The Electronic Frontier Foundation 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, American Broad. Cos., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1364988; Brief for Filmon X, LLC et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Affirmance, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 
(2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348476. 
220 Brief for Dish Network, L.L.C. & Echostar Technologies, L.L.C. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) 
(No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348475. 
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a group involving a close family circle.221  The Transmit Clause does 
not cover this type of transmission, the brief notes, as this constitutes 
a private performance.222  The amici brief for FilmOn X further as-
serts that the argument set forth by the Networks would render the 
scope of the Transmit Clause overly broad.223  As discussed further 
below, the Networks believe that the Transmit Clause focuses on the 
potential audience of the underlying work and not the audience of the 
individual transmission.  In its brief, FilmOn X finds this argument is 
too broad an interpretation of the Clause, as it would eviscerate an 
individual’s ability to perform a work privately.224  Under the view of 
the Networks, an individual private performance would then be a 
public one as an underlying work is inherently capable of being re-
ceived by anyone with equipment enabling him or her to view the 
copyrighted work, whether that equipment is through a cable compa-
ny or a roof-top antenna.225 
Since the Supreme Court in Aereo first deemed Aereo’s sys-
tem a functional equivalent to a cable system, it incorrectly assumes 
that Aereo was transmitting the same performance of the underlying 
work to all of its users simultaneously from one antenna.226  If 
Aereo’s system had been transmitting the same performance of the 
underlying work to all of its users, then Nimmer’s theory would ap-
ply, and thus, it would be appropriate to aggregate the individual 
showings of the same performance of the underlying work.227  How-
ever, Aereo’s system creates private performances because each an-
tenna captures a signal for one specific user.  This incorrect identifi-
cation leads the Court to apply this aggregate theory to all private 
performances of the underlying work to find a public performance. 
This interpretation is more akin to the analysis asserted by 
Professor Goldstein in his treatise, which rejects Nimmer’s Non-
Aggregation Theory.228  Goldstein argues that the Second Circuit’s 
 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 20-27. 
223 Brief for Filmon X, LLC et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, American 
Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348476. 
224 Id. 
225 Brief of 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, American Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 
2014 WL 1348474. 
226 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507. 
227 NIMMER, supra note 200, at 1. 
228 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167. 
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interpretation of the Transmit Clause “entirely undermined” the intent 
of the “same place-separate place . . . same time-different time . . .” 
language.229  He reasons that the Second Circuit treated “transmis-
sions” and “performances” as one in the same when he says “the Act 
clearly treats them as distinct . . . operative terms.”230  Goldstein fur-
ther argues that because the Court could not separate the two words, 
the Court essentially renders every distinct transmission as a private 
performance.231  While Goldstein may perhaps be correct in deter-
mining that the Court decided to treat “transmission” and “perfor-
mance” as one entity, his conclusion fails to incorporate the first part 
of the clause that determines when and where the transmission of a 
performance or display must occur to render it “public.”232  If read in 
its entirety, the transmission of the performance only becomes “pub-
lic” if it is done so outside of one’s home or to a small family gather-
ing inclusive of the family’s social acquaintances.233  Taken in that 
context, the Second Circuit still determined that each individual 
transmission of the performance was not sent to the public because 
they were sent to each individual user’s home.234  This placed a limi-
tation on who was capable of receiving the given transmission.235  
This limitation was important in determining whether the transmis-
sion was a public performance.  It would be absurd to assume that 
Congress intended to reflect individualized transmissions of the per-
formance to individual homes to fall within the “same place or in dif-
ferent places and at the same time or at different times” language of 
the statute simply because those individuals are situated in “separate 
places” and perhaps viewing their own individual transmissions “at 
the same time or different times.”236  Under this reading, everyone 
watching that particular transmission of the performance would be 
publicly performing.  To further drive the point that the Second Cir-
cuit did not confuse the two terms, Congress was clear in the 1976 
House Report that “any act by which the initial performance . . . is 
 
229 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168. 
230 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168. 
231 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168. 
232 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 168.  (The author also correctly asserts that nowhere in 
§ 101 is the term “public” defined; it is implicitly defined in that section under subsection (1) 
of the Act’s definition of “[T]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’.”). 
233 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167. 
234 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 138. 
235 Id. 
236 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2010). 
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transmitted, repeated, or made to recur would itself be a ‘perfor-
mance’ . . . under the bill.”237  This clear intention by Congress to 
consider a “transmission” synonymous with “performance” renders 
Goldstein’s interpretation of the Act invalid.238 
While the Networks had ample support advocating for Gold-
stein’s theory and the fact that the Transmit Clause was meant to 
have a broad interpretation,239 the Supreme Court nevertheless fol-
lowed Goldstein’s interpretation due to a misinterpretation of Nim-
mer’s theory.240  While the Court’s reasoning simply confirms that 
when the same work is given multiple showings, whether to people 
individually or together, it is a public performance of that work, what 
the Court assumes here is that Aereo is showing the same perfor-
mance to all of its users even though they are all receiving individual 
performances of the underlying work individually.  In other words, a 
public performance of a work occurs when the same performance of 
the underlying work is shown repeatedly to members of the public, 
whether they are alone at home or gathered at a public place and 
watching that same performance of the underlying work at different 
times.  This is distinguished from individuals watching their own in-
dividual performance of the underlying work; this falls under the pri-
vate performance exception implied in clause (1) of the definition for 
public performance.  The Court here confused the same performance 
of a work with the original underlying work.  This confirms why un-
derstanding Aereo’s technology is key to determining why Aereo 
does not in fact perform publicly. 
As mentioned above, Aereo’s users are assigned an individual 
antenna, which is located among thousands of other antennas.241  
Each antenna is at the mercy of the user, picking up signals when it is 
told, staying idle in all other instances, and then transmitting those 
 
237 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976). 
238 Id.; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 204, at 167. 
239 Brief for the Petitioners, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 
(2014) (No. 13-461), 1976 WL 14045; Brief for Time Warner, Inc. & Warner Bros. Enter-
tainment, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Broad. Cos., Inc., v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2013 WL 6040359; Brief for American Intellec-
tual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Broad. 
Cos., v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828067; Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, American Broad. Cos., v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079. 
240 WNET, 712 F.3d at 698 (Chin, J., dissenting); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
241 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
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signals to its owner and no one else.242  Aereo was designed to store a 
rooftop antenna equivalent in a remote location which would work 
exactly the way a rooftop antenna would work, by picking up signals 
when the user turns on the system.243  Here, a rooftop antenna is pick-
ing up the original broadcast signal and would then send that trans-
mission to the television.244  However, it is clear that the Court sees 
that because Aereo houses these antennas and not the user, it then be-
comes a cable system, even though at no time is the same perfor-
mance of the underlying work being transmitted to multiple users at 
the same time or at different times.245 
After implicitly adopting the argument that all individual pri-
vate performances should be aggregated to determine that Aereo per-
formed publicly, the Court looked to the relationship between the 
public and the underlying work.246  This argument is explained 
through an example of a parking valet and a parking garage.247  The 
Court postulates that if an entity transmits a performance to users 
who own or possess the underlying work then this is not a public per-
formance.248  This reasoning has no basis in either the Act or the 
House Report as neither contains any language imposing a require-
ment that every member of the public must have a relationship to the 
underlying work.249  The Court asserts that a private performance oc-
curs when entities transmit performances of copyrighted works to the 
 
242 Id. 
243 PROTECTMYANTENNA, supra note 78, at 1. 
244 Antennas and Digital Television, FCC, 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/antennas-and-digital-television (last visited Mar. 29, 
2016). 
245 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506-507. 
246 Id. at 2510. 
247 Id.  The Court explained: 
This is relevant because when an entity performs to a set of people, 
whether they constitute “the public” often depends upon their relation-
ship to the underlying work.  When for example, a parking valet at-
tendant returns cars to their drivers, we would not say that the parking 
service provides cars ‘to the public.’  We would say that it provides the 
cars to their owners.  We would say that a car dealership, on the other 
hand, does provide cars to the public, for it sells cars to individuals who 
lack a pre-existing relationship to the cars. 
Id. 
248 Id.  (“Similarly, an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities 
as owners or possessors does not perform ‘to the public,’ whereas an entity like Aereo that 
transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the 
works does so perform.”). 
249 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 106 (2010). 
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owners themselves.250  If the Act were to impose such a requirement, 
it would have found no need to provide for a private performance ex-
ception, because then everyone would either be holders of the exclu-
sive rights, or would have to pay the holder of the rights to view the 
materials.  The 1976 amendments made perfectly clear that it would 
be against public policy to require every member of the public to pay 
a copyright holder for the private use and enjoyment of the work.251  
It would then follow that the only members of the public who have 
any prior relationship to the copyrighted works are the copyright 
holders themselves and any member of the public viewing such work 
would be infringing upon that right even if it was done so privately. 
 
C. I Infringed, but You Were Blamed: Diminishing 
the Volitional Conduct Rule 
In copyright infringement cases concerning Internet based 
services or equipment providers, it has long been accepted by the 
Courts that direct liability is sometimes not an appropriate avenue in 
determining if conduct was infringing.252  The Supreme Court set this 
precedent in the 1980s when videocassette tapes were introduced into 
the market.253  In these cases, secondary liability is a more appropri-
ate avenue since the defendant does not directly cause the infringing 
conduct but rather “intentionally induces or encourages infringing 
acts by others for profits from such acts while declining to exercise a 
right to stop or limit them.”254  It is in this instance, the volitional 
conduct rule comes into play.  When a defendant is found directly li-
able it is because she committed the infringement by her own will, 
however when she induces or encourages such an act that causes 
someone else to commit the infringing activity she is then only sec-
ondarily liable.255 
The dissent recognized that this case should have focused on 
 
250 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
251 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2010). 
252 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
253 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417. 
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conduct rather than similarity of function.256  Infringement cases con-
cerning service providers or equipment manufacturers are typically 
determined by classifying liabilities with respect to users and the pro-
viders.257  While volitional conduct is not usually at issue in direct-
infringement cases, it becomes a point of contention when the factual 
nature of the dispute deems it necessary.258  Justice Scalia points out 
that conduct is crucial in examining a liability claim and employing a 
proper analysis on it.259 
Noticeably absent from Aereo’s majority opinion is any quali-
tative discussion on volitional conduct.  The dissent finds that the vo-
litional conduct requirement is entirely necessary to determining if 
Aereo’s system directly infringes or it if it is the users that commit 
the infringement.260  The Supreme Court in Sony established that lia-
bility in infringement suits involving service providers and equipment 
manufacturers should be determined by identifying who was in 
charge of the infringing act.261  Although in Aereo, the charge was di-
rect infringement, Justice Scalia nevertheless found that Aereo’s sys-
tem gives a substantial amount of the control of the system to Aereo’s 
users.262  Justice Scalia then likens Aereo’s system to a copy shop.263  
He emphasizes that a copy shop is never directly liable for its cus-
tomers’ infringing activities because it is the customers who control 
the equipment and not the shop or the employees themselves.264  This 
analysis more accurately reflects Aereo’s function, yet the majority 
finds that this comparison is wholly inadequate.265 
The Second Circuit in Cablevision applied the volitional con-
duct rule to further support that the RS-DVR technology did not in-
fringe.266  The RS-DVR would only produce a copy on command of 
the user; otherwise, the data would stay in the buffer system.  The 
Second Circuit then applied this analysis when determining whether 
Aereo infringed.  It found that since Aereo’s antennas were solely at 
 
256 Id. 
257 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417; Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 133. 
258 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
259 Id. at 2512-514. 
260 Id. 
261 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 435. 
262 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514. 
263 Id. at 2513. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 2507. 
266 Cartoon Network LP, 536 F.3d at 132-33. 
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the mercy of Aereo’s users, Aereo was not directly liable.267  In argu-
ing for releasing Aereo from direct liability, the amici curiae brief for 
FilmOn X acknowledges that the Court recognized that equipment 
suppliers and manufacturers are not involved in any activities that are 
infringing.268 
The absence of any discussion of secondary liability and the 
volitional conduct rule is troublesome.  While Aereo’s system is not 
quite an equipment supplier, Aereo was by no means acting on the 
behalf of any users when initiating user-specific antennas.  Instead, 
Aereo’s users had full control on the operation of the antennae and 
the signals for which the antennae were to receive. 
VII. STORM CLOUDS AHEAD: WHAT AEREO MEANS FOR CLOUD-
BASED SERVICES 
The Court failed to appreciate why a ruling against Aereo 
could have a larger impact on current cloud-computing technology.269  
In fact, the decision merely discussed the function as a formality to 
inform the reader of the facts at issue.270  The majority found Aereo’s 
system similar to a cable system because the user has no physical 
control over Aereo’s equipment or servers.271  The Court’s decision 
to leave Aereo’s cloud technology out of its analysis, and thus, ren-
dering Aereo essentially a cable system is detrimental to cloud based 
technologies for two reasons.  The absence of analysis into Aereo’s 
cloud service could have been an implication that the Court did not 
fully understand the functionality of a cloud-based service.  A cloud-
based service is essentially a storage space for data.272  When a com-
pany offers “cloud storage” it is essentially offering storage space on 
its own servers dedicated for solely that use.  The cloud can be ac-
cessed through the Internet and can be opened on any Internet capa-
ble device.  No individual has physical access of the cloud or the ser-
vice.  Take for example, the popularly used Google Drive.  Anyone 
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with a Google account can effectively upload the entire contents of 
their computers to Google Drive’s “Cloud” as an additional way to 
keep their files safe in the event their personal computer breaks down 
in some way, rendering those files irretrievable from that device.273  
That same person can access those files that were saved in the cloud 
from another device simply by logging in, where the files are safe 
from harm.  The Court’s failure to find this feature distinctive leaves 
an important question unanswered.  Do cloud based services perform 
publicly when members of the public access their personal files in 
various different places?  Suppose several users of Apple’s iCloud 
have the movie “My Fair Lady” saved to their individual cloud files.  
Now assume those users decide to watch “My Fair Lady” on or about 
the same time.  Under the Court’s ruling, this could potentially cause 
Apple to be publicly performing that movie even though individual 
users are watching distinctive copies of that movie.274 
The most important take-away from the adoption of Gold-
stein’s aggregation theory and the Court’s decision is that now, the 
Transmit clause directs us to look at who is capable of receiving the 
underlying performance.  In addition, this reasoning leads us to ag-
gregate private performances created by one entity regardless of 
whether the user intentionally caused the performance.  The reason-
ing disregards whether the person obtained the work legally because 
once that user has uploaded the work onto the cloud-based hard drive, 
any subsequent streaming of that performance renders it a public one 
because it is the cloud service that retains and performs the streaming 
of the work.  To reiterate the example above, if two users lawfully 
obtain “My Fair Lady” and wish to watch their individual copy at the 
same time, it is now the cloud service who is publicly performing that 
work which they had not obtained a license for because the user’s 
conduct under Aereo has now been disregarded, and the private per-
formances should be aggregated because they came from the same 
entity. 
The Court made clear that Aereo is not an equipment provider 
because users do not have physical access to every part of its tech-
nology, including the servers that hold copies of the transmissions 
 
273 Using Drive, GOOGLE (Feb. 16, 2016), https://accounts.google.com/signup.  (The first 
15 gigabytes of storage are free when signing up for a Google Drive account, any increase in 
storage space is available for an additional fee). 
274 Cablevision Systems Corp., Aereo and the Public Performance Right, CABLEVISION  
(Dec. 2013), http://www.cablevision.com/pdf/cablevision_aereo_white_paper.pdf. 
36
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/8
2016 BEYOND THE CLOUD 311 
and/or relay transmission to the user.275  The Court however, does at-
tempt to answer this quandary by providing that the holding would 
pertain to technology only resembling that of cable companies.276  
The most troubling part of the majority’s analysis is the acknowl-
edgement that Aereo’s system only begins to run when the user pur-
posely communicates with Aereo’s system that he or she wishes to 
watch or record a show.277  However, this function is found to have 
no significant impact on whether Aereo performs.278  This astounding 
acknowledgement and disregard for this crucial feature essentially 
obliterates the precedent set forth by Sony.279  Yet, it is because the 
Court failed to employ an analysis based on Aereo’s technology and 
instead offered reasoning based on function, which simply compared 
Aereo to a cable system, that cloud technology could possibly face a 
flood of litigation. 
However, as society relies on further technological advance-
ments, developers have an added burden not to resemble older tech-
nologies, as the Court may not recognize the difference. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
While it remains to be seen whether Cloud storage systems 
will be liable for copyright infringement under Aereo, there are still 
unanswered questions.  While for the time being, the Court seemed to 
place its toes in the water by giving some leeway to Cloud storage 
systems, as technology develops, the Courts may not be able to rest 
upon certain principles such as technological blindness or that many 
cloud users actually have obtained copyrighted works stored in their 
clouds legally.280  Many commenters on Aereo have suggested that 
either Congress needs to develop legislation more rapidly to adapt to 
the ever-changing technological climate, others feel as if the Courts 
needs to implement an additional step in how to distinguish new 
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technologies from older ones.281  The most promising change might 
come from the Federal Communications Commission.  In as late as 
December 2014, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
which sets out to include platforms akin to Aereo in the list of entities 
that may be able to apply for a § 111 compulsory license.282  Howev-
er, there still has not been a ruling on the matter and any changes re-
garding licensing for Internet television providers may not come for 
quite some time. 
 
 
281 Collette Corser, Recent Development, American Broad. Cos. v. Aereo: How the Su-
preme Court’s Flawed Rationale Will Implicate Problems in New Technologies, 16 N.C. J.L. 
& TECH. ON 1, 27-30 (2015); Amanda Asaro, Comment, Stay Tuned: Whether Cloud-Based 
Service Providers Can Have Their Copyrighted Cake and Eat It Too, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1107, 1140-42 (2014); Geoffrey Palachuk, Aereo: Bringing the NFL to a “Cloud” Near 
You: How Evolving Technology Demands Rapid Reevaluation of Legislative Protections in 
Light of Streaming Television Broadcasts, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 117, 137-43 (2015). 
282 29 FCC Rcd. 15995. 
38
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 2, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss2/8
